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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GARY J. WITHERSPOON,

.'

, ' :

Plaintiff-Respondent# i
vs.

Case No. 14285

:

WALTER T. STEWART, et a] ., ,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

'•

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE uF THh CASK

Plaintiff-Respondent, Gary J. Witherspoon, sued DefendantAppellant, Walter T. Stewart, asking fnr a Writ* of

Replevin

for the return of JS head of cattle purchased by the DefendantAppellant through mesne conveyances from Plaintiff claiming
t:i tl e I: lad i lot passed fr oirt 1 :i :i m

ai id 1 :c 1 la < e ai l amoi n i1 :» I: $ ] 500 00

paid by oi le of the mesne purchasers to the Plaintiff be de- Glared liquidated damages to the Plaintiff.
The <(»theJ: named Defendants were i lot ser \ red.

••

^ '

• • Pending trial the cattle were sold and the proceeds
applied to the benefit of Plaintiff,

Defendant-Appellant

Stewart amended his pleadings by leave

.; \-:,l

asking for judgment against Plaintiff-Respondent, Gary J.
WitlierspocH"

III I IK

.mumim i
l M| YBSUU 1)11
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paid for the cattle.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
"

The matter was tried on the issue of whether Defendant

was entitled to the $8500.00 paid by him for the cattle.
The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff,
Gary J. Witherspoon, and against Defendant Stewart —

the

trial court ruling that the pertinent bills of sale did not
meet the requirements of the Utah Livestock Brank and AntiTheft Act. -."'* '^*.^.:.^;-: ' 'M-

:.;.....-:: ;:;eck; - , •

:•; w^.'.'

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant, Walter T. Stewart, seeks reversal
of the trial Court's ruling and prays judgment against
Plaintiff-Respondent in the amount of $8500.00.
">••% STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a professor of Anthropology at Weber State
College and part-time farmer, owned the cattle which are the
subject matter of this action.

The cattle bore the brand of

Plaintiff which had been duly registered.
kept in two separate corrals —

The cattle were

one in Juab County and one

in Sanpete County.
Sometime in February, 1974, Jerry Yeck gave Plaintiff,
Gary Witherspoon, $1500.00 as an earnest money deposit on
the purchase of 35 head of cattle. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
last page)
On Monday, February 17, 1974, Jerry Yeck, for Deseret
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Distributing Company, purchased from Plaintiff, Gary Witherspoon, 35 head of yearlings and calves giving two checks as
payment, one for $815.00 and another for $11,450.00, each
dated February 20, 1974. Witherspoon gave Deseret Distributing Company a bill of sale in his own handwriting granting
Deseret full ownership and possession of the cattle. This
transaction took place at Ogden, Utah. (Pg. 1 of Plfs. Exh. 1)
Pursuant to a bill of sale dated February 19f 1974,
Yeck, for Deseret Distributing Company, sold the subject
cattle to American Federal Corporation.

Yeck displayed to

American Federal the Witherspoon bill of sale, and took representatives of American Federal to a corral in Mills, Utah
County, and another in Fayette, Utah, where the cattle were
located.
On Thursday, February 21, 1974, Defendant-Appellant,
Walter T. Stewart, was contacted by American Federal to sell
the cattle to him.

Stewart visited both sites and looked at

the cattle. Mr. Seth McPherson, acting as custodian of the
cattle, showed the cattle, where to load them, and how to get
trucks in to the loading area. On February 21, 1974, Stewart
gave American Federal a cashier's check in the amount of
$8500.00 for the 35 head of cattle ($8500.00 being the market
price of said cattle as of that date as stipulated to by
counsel at trial), and received a bill of sale. (Def.fs Exh. 6)
Two days later, February, 23, Stewart rented two trucks
- 3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and hired one driver and proceeded to Mills, Utah, to pick
up the 20 head of cattle in that corral.

The custodian of

the cattle, Seth McPherson, initially directed the loading
of the cattle; helped load the first truck with seven head,
but subsequently reported that "a lady over there says there
is something wrong with the title to those cattle." He,
thereupon, did not help further loading but let Stewart and
his man load the rest.
In the meantime, the two checks given in the total
amount of $12,335.00 by Yeck to Witherspoon had been dishonored by the bank, leaving only the $1500.00 payment to
Witherspoon.

Witherspoon contacted certain law agencies to

report this.

,

Subsequently, the Highway Patrol stopped the two trucks
Stewart had rented while the cattle were being transported.
The cattle were impounded and later sold.

The monies were

credited to Plaintiff pending trial.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PERTINENT BILLS OF SALE WERE VOID.
The trial court held that the pertinent bills of sale
did not meet the requirements of the Utah Livestock Brank
and Anti-Theft Act, Section 4-13-17, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) (R. 72), and that therefore title to the 35 head of
cattle never passed from Witherspoon (R. 96). In ruling the
•

-

4

-

"-
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transfers void, the Court held that:
The Anti-Theft and Branding statute is designed
to protect not only the owners of livestock but
those who would purchase livestock to insure that
good title might be conveyed. The statute was designed for the protection of Walter Stewart and he
did not comply with the statute and therefore cannot claim ownership to the cattle. The mandate of
the statute is clear. A transfer of title is valid
only if effected in conformity with Section 4-13-17,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Pugh v. Stratton, 22
Utah 2d 190, 450 P. 2d 463, (1969). (R.96)
Utah law is contrary.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Burrows, 27
Utah 2d 436, 497 P. 2d 240 (1972), that a bill of sale that
does not meet all of the requirements of the Utah Livestock
Brand and Anti-Theft Act is not necessarily void.
In Wilson v. Burrows there had been no attempt by the
parties to comply with the Anti-Theft Act requirements regarding bills of sale.

There was a Uniform Real Estate Contract

which provided:
The Seller agrees to release all cattle to the
buyer so that he may put them under loan in his
name. 27 Utah 2d at 439
The trial court in Wilson v. Burrows held that this was
insufficient to pass ownership to the purchaser.

But the Utah

Supreme Court reversed holding that:
It is Wilsons1 contention here that the Utah
Livestock Brand and Anti-Theft Act controlled the
sale of the cattle to Burrows, and that the making
of a contract in violation of its provisions was
void. The purpose of the statute was aimed at the
theft of livestock within the State and to impede
the sale of stolen animals. It would not appear
- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the Legislature intended the statute to
apply to sales such as we have here between
the Wilsons and Burrows. In any event, the
Wilsons cannot now claim that their contracts
entered into with Burrows were not made in good
faith. We must conclude that the contracts
were not void. 27 Utah 2d at 439-440 (emphasis
added)
In the instant case, the bill of sale from Witherspoon
to Deseret Distributing which the Court held to be void for
failure to comply with the statute (Plaintiff's Exh. 1, pg. 1)
contained the following information:
1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The date
The name and address (city only) of the seller
The telephone number of seller
The name and address (city only) of the buyer's agent
The name of the buyer
The number and sex of the cattle
The description and location of the brand
The number of the brand certificate registered to
seller
9. That statement that seller sells the cattle giving
full rights of ownership and possession
10. Signatures of buyer's agent and seller
The only requirement of Section 4-13-17 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953) not expressed in this bill of sale is the
place of purchase.

The statute does not specify whether this

is to be where the transaction takes place or where the cattle
are located.
In finding Witherspoon's bill of sale void, the trial
court relied upon Pugh v. Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P. 2d
463 (1969).

That case is not in point, however, inasmuch as

the purchaser therein did not obtain a written bill of sale.
In holding that transfer invalid the Supreme Court held:
- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The import of the entire act compels one to
conclude that Woodard's possession was unlawful
from the time of delivery since he did not
receive a written bill of sale. 22 Utah 2d at 194
The lack of a written bill of sale in Pugh renders
that case useless as precedent in the instant case, but the
Witherspoon's transfer was clearly valid under the Wilson v.
Burrows case, (supra page 5)
This Court should not allow a seller by technical omissions or deficiencies in the bill of sale given by him to profit
as against innocent third parties.

To uphold the trial court's

ruling would encourage sellers to give bills of sales which
would be technically deficient in some manner in order to preserve a right to revoke the transaction.

This was not the

purpose of the Anti-Theft Act and would render a substantial
injustice in the instant case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE BILL OF SALE
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT STEWART WAS
DEFECTIVE DOES NOT BAR DISCOVERY BY STEWART.
The bill of sale received by Stewart (Defendant's Exhibit
6) substantially complies with the requirements of the statute,
and in any event it comes closer to compliance than the bill
of sale held valid in Wilson v. Burrows, 27 Utah 2d 436, 497
P. 2d 240 (1972).
The conclusions of law made by the trial court with
respect to this bill of sale do not justify a ruling rendering
- 7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the bill of sale received by Stewart void.
a.

The actual delivery of the animals was not accom-

panied by a written bill of sale. (R. 96)
This requirement of the statute does not provide that
a bill of sale may not be given in advance of actual delivery
and, in fact, this Appellant contends that giving a bill of
sale in advance of delivery actually exceeds the statutory
requirement.

The use of the word "delivery" implies that the

livestock in question will be "delivered to" the purchaser.
In such case it would be reasonable to give a bill of sale at
that time.

If the animals are to be picked up by the purchaser,

however, it would be reasonable that he have a bill of sale in
his possession at the time he arrives at the location of the
cattle.
b.

This is in fact what happened.
The bill of sale did not indicate a place of purchase.

(R. 96)
It is unclear whether this means the place where the
money transfers hands or, where the cattle are located, or
where they are to be delivered to.

In any event, it seems that

the purpose of this statutory requirement is to provide some
identification as to which livestock are being sold.

This

issue was not raised in the instant case and has no application
herein.
c.

The bill of sale did not contain the signature and

address of the buyer and seller. (R. 96)
-

8

-

••
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Stewart's seller did in fact sign his bill of sale
(Def.'s Exh. 6 ) , although Stewart did not.

This requirement

is clearly for the benefit of Stewart and his seller. Neither
Stewart nor his seller (who is not a party hereto) raises the
issue, and therefore, Witherspoon has no standing to complain.
d.

Since the brand belonged to Gary J. Witherspoon and

was recorded in his name, the seller was obligated to provide
proof of ownership from whom the cattle were purchased, and
the length of time held in his possession. (R. 96)
This appears to be a more important requirement, but one
which was met in the instant case.

Stewart saw the two prior

bills of sale showing a chain of title from Witherspoon.
Witherspoon1s deed showed that the brand belonged to him and
substantiated the fact by setting forth the certificate number
of the brand.
traced.

Moreover, the time of possession can be also

Witherspoon's February 18, 1974, bill of sale (Page 1

of Plaintiff's Exh. 1) gives ownership and Deseret possession;
Deseret's bill of sale to American is dated the 19th and American's to Stewart is dated the 20th. Witherspoon obtains no
right arising out of any deficiency in Stewart's bill of sale
and such deficiencies do not mandatorily prevent title from
passing.
If Witherspoon's transfer as per page 1 of Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 (the bill of sale to him from Deseret Distributing)
was sufficient to convey title, Stewart was entitled to possession of the animals as opposed to Witherspoon for the further
- 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reason that although named in the Complaint, Witherspoon
never made Deseret Distributing a party to the action.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NO BRAND
INSPECTION CERTIFICATE WAS OBTAINED DOES
NOT VOID AN OTHERWISE VALID TRANSFER.
Stewart concedes that no brand inspection certificate
was obtained pursuant to Section 4-13-17.5 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953).

This statute is as follows:

All changes of ownership through private sale
or transactions, or at public auctions or commission
houses, shall be accompanied by a brand inspection
certificate.
This statute does not require automatic invalidation of
all transfers made without a certificate.

In light of the

facts of this case, no protection to either party would have
been afforded by compliance with this requirement.
CONCLUSION
Witherspoon seeks to have the transaction declared void,
while retaining the $1500.00 paid to him as earnest money (the
remaining checks in the amount of $12,265.00 did not clear the
bank) on the ground that the bill of sale he drafted was insufficient.

This position is taken at the expense of Stewart who

had nothing to do with the preparation of Witherspoon's bill
of sale, who paid the market price for said animals of $8500.00,
all of which under the trial court's ruling he loses to Withersppon due to Witherspoon*s own error.
The judgment entered below holding Witherspoon1s transfer
- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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void is based completely upon Pugh v. Stratton (R. 72) .
In contrast to the instant case, however, that case did not
involve a written bill of sale.

Moreover, as explained in

Wilson v. Burrows by the Utah Supreme Court, Utah law does
not automatically void a bill of sale which does not conform
to all the technical requirements of the Utah Livestock Brand
and Anti-Theft Act,
The judgment below should be reversed and judgment
entered for $8500.00 in favor of Defendant-Appellant Stewart.

Respectfully submitted,
Walter T. Stewart, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Richard Richards,
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 670 28th Street, Ogden, Utah,
84403, this

day of January, 1976.
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